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BROUDO: THE UNLIKELY TORT OF
“SECURITIES FRAUD”
OLEG CROSS*

I. INTRODUCTION
Created pursuant to section 10 of the 1934 Securities Act,1 Rule
10b-5 is a cornerstone of the federal securities laws. The federal
courts’ interpretations have largely defined the rule, which seeks to
remedy a broad range of securities fraud and market manipulation.
Elements of the rule, such as “scienter” and “reliance,” were defined
at length by earlier court decisions. However, no court had
definitively held whether a private plaintiff must demonstrate a causal
connection between an alleged fraud and the subsequent loss to that
plaintiff. This issue, referred to as “loss causation,” was decided by the
Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.2 The Court,
reversing a prior Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held “loss causation”
must be established in every case brought under Rule 10b-5 by
pleading and proving a causal connection between the alleged fraud
and the subsequent loss. This new requirement is commonly believed
to have changed the landscape of private securities litigation,
establishing a higher pleading hurdle in all securities-fraud cases.
Interestingly, as this Commentary demonstrates, the federal securities
laws contain no foundation for, nor any history of, the requirement of
“loss causation.” Instead, the element of “loss causation” recently
added to the pleading requirements of a securities fraud claim is a
product of tort law, economic analysis, and common sense.

* 2006 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000).
2. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff-class was stockholders in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
(“Dura”) who had purchased Dura stock on the public market. This
purchase led to the subsequent securities fraud class action against
3
Dura. Plaintiffs’ theory of the case was that “[i]n reliance on the
integrity of the market, [the plaintiffs] . . . paid artificially inflated
4
prices for Dura securities,” causing the plaintiffs to suffer damages.
The class alleged that Dura or its officials made false statements
concerning profits; falsely claimed that drug sales were expected to be
profitable; and falsely claimed that the FDA would soon approve its
asthmatic spray device.5 Plaintiffs further alleged that the company
subsequently announced that its earnings would be lower than
expected due to slow drug sales, and the company’s share price
declined.6 The allegations also chronicle a Dura announcement, eight
months following the sales announcement, that the FDA would not
approve Dura’s asthmatic spray device. The day following that
announcement Dura’s share price fell again, though it almost fully
recovered a week later.7
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the drugprofitability claim failed to allege an appropriate scienter, and that the
spray-device claim failed adequately to allege “loss causation.”8 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint adequately alleged
9
“loss causation,” basing its decision on the theory that “plaintiffs
establish loss causation if they have shown that the price on the date
10
of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation.” The
court added that “the injury occurs at the time of the transaction,”
and because the complaint pleaded “that the price at the time of
purchase was overstated,” these allegations were sufficient to prove
“loss causation.”11
The Supreme Court granted review of the Ninth Circuit decision
in order to settle a split between the Circuits and their varying
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 339.
Id.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id.
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12
versions of “loss causation.” The Ninth Circuit, unlike other Courts
of Appeal, held that the element of “loss causation” is satisfied by the
13
allegation that share price at the time of the purchase was inflated.
More specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff need not
allege a subsequent drop in price to meet the injury requirement
because the injury occurs at the time of the transaction.14
By contrast, the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff cannot allege
merely that had he known the true “investment quality” of the stock
he would not have purchased it. Such allegations are simply assertions
15
and do not answer the question of why the money was lost. The
court concluded that, “plaintiffs demonstrate a causal connection
between the content of the alleged misstatements or omissions and
‘the harm actually suffered.’”16
Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that “[w]here the value of the
security does not actually decline as a result of an alleged
misrepresentation, it cannot be said that there is in fact an economic
loss attributable to that misrepresentation.”17 Moreover, the Third
Circuit’s decision has gone a step further, holding that the plaintiff
must demonstrate not only a causal connection between
misrepresentation and decline in price, but also a “correction in the
market price,” which would cause an inflated price to drop and
thereby harm the plaintiff.18 Absent such “correction,” a plaintiff can
19
sell securities at the inflated price, thus suffering no loss.
The Eleventh Circuit took an approach that was a less-than-clear
case-by-case analysis. A plaintiff need not prove that the misstatement
by the defendant was the sole cause of loss, but that it was a
20
“’substantial,’ i.e., a significant contributing cause.” On the other
hand, the Seventh Circuit, held that “’loss causation’ is just an exotic
name for a standard requirement of tort law,” equating “loss

12. Compare Broudo, 339 F.3d at 933, with Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v.
Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2003); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d
165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000); Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447–48 (11th Cir. 1997);
Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990).
13. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938.
14. Id.
15. Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 198.
16. Id. at 199.
17. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 185.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997).
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21
causation” to “proximate cause.” The Seventh Circuit’s decision
concerning “loss causation” may have influenced the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Dura.

III. HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and rejected the
notion that a plaintiff only has to allege price-inflation due to the
22
defendant’s misrepresentation. Rather, the Court held that in Rule
10b-5 cases, inflated price “will not itself constitute or proximately
23
cause the relevant economic loss.” In doing so, the Court appeared
to have adopted the Seventh Circuit “no hurt, no tort” proximate
cause approach to loss causation.24 Moreover, the Court went a step
further than the Third Circuit, reasoning that, even if sold later at a
lower price, the decline may not be due to the market correction of
such misrepresentation, but to other independent factors.25 Such
factors, the Court explained, could be “changed economic
circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or
firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events.”26 The Court concluded
that, though an inflated purchase price may sometimes result in a
27
future loss, the former does not cause the latter as a matter of law.
This decision was largely based on the Court’s conclusion that to
allow recovery based on a simple allegation of misrepresentation
would be “to provide investors with broad insurance against market
losses, [instead of protecting] them against those economic losses that
misrepresentations actually cause.”28

21. Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990).
22. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005).
23. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78(b); see also 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. Rule 10b-5 prohibits any fraud
or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security registered on a national
exchange.
24. Compare Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342–43, with Bastian, 892 F.2d at 685.
25. Compare Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342–43 (“If the purchaser sells later after the
truth makes its way into the market place, an initially inflated purchase price might mean a later
loss. But that is far from inevitably so.“), with Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 185
(3d Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of a correction in the market price, the cost of the alleged
misrepresentation is still incorporated into the value of the security and may be recovered at
any time simply by reselling the security at the inflated price.”).
26. Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 343.
27. Id. at 346.
28. Id. at 345.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Court’s decision in Dura, albeit not intentionally, evidences
the pre-existing tensions between both securities law and tort law and
between deterrence and fairness. An overriding purpose of the federal
securities laws in general, and of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
29
(“1934 Act”) specifically, is to ensure public confidence in the
national financial markets by deterring fraud and encouraging
disclosure, in part, through the availability of private securities fraud
actions,30 the scope of which is defined by the Private Securities
31
Litigation Reform Act (“Reform Act”). In an effort to further the
deterrent goals of the federal securities laws, the Reform Act provides
for a number of punitive measures. For instance, section 21 of the
Reform Act provides that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“Commission”) may “in its discretion” investigate any person, and if
the court determines that the person has violated any section of the
1934 Act, including section 10(b),32 the court may, pursuant to section
21, impose a penalty on the violator.33 The amount of penalty is to be
determined by the court in light of the circumstances, and ranges from
$5,000 to $100,000 for a natural person and from $50,000 to $500,000
for a corporate entity.34 Alternatively, the court may impose a penalty
in the “gross amount of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result
35
of the violation.” Thus, as long as the Commission can show that the
defendant violated section 10,36 the defendant can face a penalty
regardless of any loss the defendant corporation’s shareholders may
have suffered.
Based on the Court’s decision in Dura, however, a plaintiff
bringing a 10b-5 action cannot recover based only on the violation of

29. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000). In addition to the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933, Section 10 of the 1934 Act provided private purchasers of securities with a remedy
against fraud.
30. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986); Theodore Altman et al., 1-1 Federal
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 1.01 (2005).
31. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
32. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. Rule 10b-5 derives from § 10 of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
33. Id. § 78u.
34. Id. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i).
35. Id.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 10(b) prohibits the “use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security, . . . [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe.”
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Section 10 of the 1934 Act; instead, the plaintiff must prove that its
37
loss was proximately caused by the defendant. This disparity appears
to run counter to the fraud-deterrent purpose of the federal securities
laws, which, considering section 21 of the Reform Act, emphasizes
liability for violation irrespective of resultant harm.38
Furthermore, section 21D(b)(1) of the Reform Act, which governs
private securities fraud actions, likewise provides nothing concerning
39
proximate cause. Section 21D(b)(1) requires that the complaint
specify each allegedly misleading statement, the reason why it may be
misleading, and the surrounding facts of why the statements are
believed to be false.40 Subsection (b)(2)41 provides that the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant acted with “a particular state of mind”
(i.e. “knowingly” or with “scienter”).42 However, the Reform Act is
43
silent on the requirements of economic loss or causation. Plainly,
there is nothing in the history of sections 10 of the 1934 Act or
sections 21 and 21D of the Reform Act that implicates “proximate
cause.”
The credit for initially attaching the requirement of proximate
cause to Rule 10b-5, which, in essence, linked securities law to tort
44
law, appears to go to Judge Richard A. Posner. Although federal
courts have applied tort law principles to 10b-5 actions before,45 Judge
Posner was the first to interpret section 10 and Rule 10b-5 in light of

37. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A) (“Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any
person has violated any provision of this Act . . . the Commission may bring an action in a
United States district court to seek . . . a civil penalty to be paid by the person who committed
such violation.”).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.
40. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1).
41. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
42. Id.
43. Similarly, Hazen’s Law of Securities Regulation, cited by the Court in Dura, does not
mention “proximate cause” in its definition of “loss causation,” and instead limits the extent of
required causation to the statutory “in connection with” – a causation standard that has been
previously interpreted by the courts as “de minimus touch.” THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION, §§ 12.11[1], [3] (2002); see also Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342;
Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1028 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting that “the
alleged deceptive practice only need be ‘touching’ the sale of securities”).
44. Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990).
45. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983) (applying tort
principles to find an implied right of action against aiding and abetting a section 10(b)
violation); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966)
(applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 to section 10(b) actions).
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46
basic notions of tort law and economic efficiency. At the heart of
Judge Posner’s argument for reading proximate cause into Rule 10b-5
is his proposition that “[n]o social purpose would be served by
encouraging everyone who suffers an investment loss because of an
unanticipated change in market conditions to pick through office
memoranda with a fine-tooth comb in the hope of uncovering a
misrepresentation.”47 Judge Posner’s arguments, or their subsequent
rendering, appeared to resonate with the Supreme Court in Dura. In
the words of Justice Souter: “If you have no damages, you have no
cause—I mean, on normal tort theory, you have no cause of action.”48
At first glance, framing a securities fraud action in tort terms
appears disconnected from the original purpose of the 1934 Act—to
deter fraud and to encourage disclosure.49 After all, if, after finding a
mistake in the offering materials and seeing a subsequent share
decline, a plaintiff brings suit, is the fraud-deterrent goal of the 1934
not served by a finding of liability irrespective of any connection
between the mistake and the share decline? It is not. The anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws are designed to prevent (and
punish) fraud—not honest mistakes. Furthermore, the concept of a
“causation-free” securities fraud remedy would ultimately hurt
investors by unjustly forcing them to absorb the costs of meritless
securities fraud litigation, undermining the purpose of the 1934 Act
and all other federal securities laws.

V. CONCLUSION
Even after the enactment of the Reform Act, which was designed
to curb meritless claims, securities fraud actions have continued to be
so ubiquitous and have such a high potential for abuse that they have
become a means for investors to hedge against market risks.50 A
particularly unfortunate by-product of the pre-Dura causational
uncertainty in securities fraud cases is the so-called “strike suit”—a
meritless claim that has little chance of success in court, but may

46. See Bastian, 892 F.2d at 685.
47. Id.
48. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Dura Pharms., Inc., 54 U.S. 336 (No. 03-932).
49. 49.Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986); Altman, supra note 30, at § 1.01.
50. See William S. Feinstein, Pleading Securities Fraud With Particularity—Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) in the Rule 10b-5 Context: Kowal v. MCI Communications Corporation, 63
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 851, 852 (1995) (discussing the ubiquity of meritless claims).
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compel the defendant to settle for an amount far in excess of the
51
claim’s verdict value.” Strike suits can have a catastrophic effect on a
company’s financial well-being because of the severe stigma attached
to the defendant company charged with an anti-fraud violation under
the 1934 Act.52 Even worse, as the defendant company’s value declines
in the public market, the taint of securities fraud allegations
ultimately hurts innocent investors.
The Court’s decision in Dura did more than impose an exacting
pleading standard in securities fraud actions—Dura eliminated the
possibility of senseless harm to innocent companies and investors,
which creates a better-controlled private anti-fraud litigation regime
and engenders investor confidence.

51. Id. at 864; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975) (“[A]
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of success at trial has a
settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial so long as
he may prevent the suit from being resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment.”);
Surovwitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966) (discussing the filing of strike suits
“to coerce corporate managers to settle worthless claims in order to get rid of them”).
52. See Feinstein, supra note 50, at 852.

